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Abstract 
This paper reflects on current discussions about the meeting of Buddhism and Western psychology in 
the field of mindfulness from the perspective of Buddhist psychology (BP). The epistemology and 
methodology of BP and Western clinical psychology differ significantly. The first-person Buddhist and 
the third-person scientific approaches to understanding and evidencing mindfulness appear to be 
irreconcilable. However, BP and Buddhist ethics provide frameworks with which contemporary 
scientific research can be scrutinised. Such scrutiny can provide new perspectives on psychological 
and ethical shortcomings of modern Western scientific epistemology and methodology. BP is the 
foundation for the Western science of mindfulness. It is argued that BP could play a more important 
role in the training of scientists in mindfulness. By bridging Buddhist and Western psychology in the 
science of mindfulness, it appears to be possible to initiate critical psychological and ethical reflection 
of how modern Western science approaches, constructs, and conditions the world and its 
inhabitants. Such reflection, and consequent mindful scientific changes, could be of invaluable use in 
reducing the suffering of sentient beings in this world. 
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Kurzzusammenfassung 
In diesem Artikel werden gegenwärtige Diskurse in der Begegnung zwischen Buddhismus und 
westlicher Psychologie im Feld der Achtsamkeit aus der Perspektive der buddhistischen Psychologie 
(BP) reflektiert. Die Epistemologie und Methodologie von BP und westlicher klinischer Psychologie 
unterscheiden sich signifikant. Der erste-Person buddhistische und der dritte-Person 
wissenschaftliche Zugang zum Verständnis und zur Evidenz der Achtsamkeit erscheint unvereinbar. 
BP und buddhistische Ethik stellen jedoch einen Rahmen zur Verfügung, in dem man gegenwärtige 
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wissenschaftliche Forschung hinterfragen kann. Eine solche Herangehensweise kann neue 
Perspektiven zu psychologischen und ethischen Defiziten der modernen westlich wissenschaftlichen 
Epistemologie und Methodologie bereitstellen. BP ist die Grundlage für die westliche Wissenschaft 
der Achtsamkeit und könnte eine entscheidendere Rolle in der Ausbildung von WissenschafterInnen 
im Feld der Achtsamkeit spielen. Durch die Verbindung von buddhistischer und westlicher 
Psychologie in der Wissenschaft der Achtsamkeit könnten kritische psychologische und ethische 
Reflexionen initiiert werden – betreffend des Zuganges zur, der Konstruktion und der 
Konditionierung der Welt und ihrer BewohnerInnen durch die moderne westliche Wissenschaft. 
Solche Reflexionen und darauf folgende achtsame wissenschaftliche Veränderungen könnten von 
unschätzbarem Wert für die Linderung von Leiden von fühlenden Wesen in dieser Welt sein. 
Schlüsselwörter 
Achtsamkeit; Buddhistische Psychologie; Wissenschaft; Epistemologie; Methodologie; Ethik; 
Abhidhamma, sutta, Prozess; Indische Psychologie; Freundlichkeit, Mitgefühl; Christentum 
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Understanding mindfulness: Current epistemological, methodological, and 
ethical issues 
This paper is a contribution to recent discussions about the meeting of Buddhism and Western 
psychology in the field of mindfulness (Amaro, 2015; Baer, 2015; Bodhi, 2011; Davis, 2015; Gethin, 
2011; Greenberg & Mitra, 2015; Grossman, 2015; Kabat-Zinn, 2011; Kuan, 2008, 2011; Kwee, 2010; 
Kwee, Gergen, & Koshikawa, 2006; Levine, 2009; Lindahl, 2015; Lopez, 2012; Mathers, Miller, & 
Ando, 2009; Mikulas, 2015; Monteiro, Musten, & Compson, 2015; Nauriyal, Drummond, & Lal, 2006; 
Pickering, 1997; Purser, 2015; Rao, Paranjpe, & Dalal, 2008; Sharf, 2015; Van Gordon, Shonin, 
Griffiths, & Singh, 2015; Watson, 2008; Wegela, 2009; Williams & Kabat-Zinn, 2011). We are 
concerned with epistemological dimensions underlying the dialogue and integration of traditional 
(Pāli) Buddhist and contemporary clinical mindfulness from the perspective of Buddhist psychology 
(BP), a field that belongs to applied Buddhist studies and cross-cultural psychology, more precisely to 
the field of (non-Western) indigenous psychologies. One of the most important indigenous 
psychologies that have been studied in cross-cultural psychology in recent years is Indian psychology 
(IP), of which BP is a part (Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis, & Sam, 2011; Rao, Paranjpe, & 
Dalal, 2008). 
We argue that the epistemology underpinning contemporary modern Western science shows 
significant points of difference from the epistemology underpinning Buddhism and BP. We clarify 
epistemological issues and consider possibilities of integration of Buddhist ethics and psychology into 
Western science. The Western science of mindfulness may facilitate such integration by bridging East 
and West. This work is inevitably exploratory, but we argue that despite some real differences of 
approach and intention, BP could play a more significant role in the field of Western contemporary 
clinical mindfulness and the training of scientists. 
BP is concerned with the parts in the system of Buddhism that elaborate questions of consciousness, 
experience, and behaviour. In this commentary BP refers to the early Buddhist psychological 
teachings in the Pāli literature, especially the Buddha’s “psychology” that is recorded in the Pāli 
canon. We use three main textual sources. These are the historically oldest treatises of the Sutta-
piṭaka (Pāli, “the basket of the discourses”), which describes situations in which the Buddha taught 
and practised in dialogue and narrative form; the Abhidhamma, the canonical “higher teaching”, that 
elaborates mental states, mental factors, and their relationship to the body on a moment by moment 
basis, often in tabular form; and the “commentaries”, a collection of literature finally committed to 
writing in the 5th to 6th century CE that represents elements that would have accumulated in the 
centuries before, while the tradition was still primarily oral. The Sutta-piṭaka and the Abhidhamma 
date from the period of oral transmission, from around 400 BCE. The understanding of the mind and 
its relationship to the world described in this paper as BP cannot be defined or regarded as a static 
system, though this paper is mostly concerned with the earliest strata of texts, which maintain within 
the different collections a consistent and self-conscious coherence of approach. BP may be 
considered a philosophical, a phenomenological psychological, or a religious psychology (De Silva, 
2014; Ghose, 2004; Kalupahana, 1987; Olendzki, 2010; Pickering, 2006; Virtbauer, 2014), that 
evolved over centuries through original text, practice, and evolutionary development. As it is still a 
Understanding mindfulness: Current epistemological, methodological, and ethical issues  25   
 
© SFU Forschungsbulletin SFU Research Bulletin 2017 (2) 
living tradition of practice and theory, we also cite modern teachings to demonstrate the way that 
some terms and mental states are taught in modern South and Southeast Asian contexts. What is 
referred to in this paper as BP is the psychology that underpins the qualitative and intuitive way of 
doing psychological research by the means of mindfulness and meditation: mindfulness is just one, if 
crucial, element in arousing, accompanying, and even defining the awakened mind. In addition, 
ethics and psychology are indivisibly connected in Buddhism. So BP could also be referred to as 
“Buddhist psychological ethics” (Rhys Davids, 1900/1974, 1936; Virtbauer, 2012). 
1 Buddhist Psychology 
1.1 Key Features of Importance in the Dialogue with Western Psychology  
It is not possible to explore all the implications of the Buddhist psychological understanding here, but 
some key features are critical in connection to transcultural epistemological, methodological, and 
ethical issues. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to demonstrate some crucially 
distinct features of Buddhist systems of understanding the mind: 
1. The intention of the Buddhist textual material is not “scientific” in the modern sense. It 
describes, albeit in the third person and in neutral, etic terms the nature of the mind when it 
is skilful, or wholesome, and the nature of the mind when it is troubled, disturbed or 
distorted in some way. This is examined too from an experiential, emic point of view, as part 
of an ongoing path to awakening. According to the Abhidhamma method consciousness 
arises within a succession of thought-moments, in changing forms, and according to certain 
patterns that maintain its continuity over any given lifespan. The skilful mind, according to 
the Abhidhamma, may arise for only a few thought moments in the continuum of 
consciousness; but when it does, it is accompanied by other factors that may be promoted 
and sustained by the practitioner. 
2. BP has a clear intention, which involves assumptions that may not be shared by modern 
Western psychological systems: 
a. That although the Buddha describes all of us as “ill”, for the Buddha the cure is the 
path that leads to freedom, and activity within that path (AN V 218–219; MN I 501–
524). 
b. That ethical behaviour is itself “happy”, productive of good result, and a necessary 
concomitant to mental culture and cure, though not a source of freedom in itself 
(Harvey, 2013, pp. 264–286; MN I 76, 483; MN III 170–178).      
c. That the seat of consciousness is the heart (hadaya), not the head (the brain), a 
feature apparently shared by many cultures, for whom the privileging of the “head” 
over the heart seems curious and experientially inaccurate, wherever the still 
debated locus of consciousness may reside from a physiological, clinical, and legal 
point of view (As 140 [trans. Rhys Davids & Tin, 1920/1958, Vol. I, pp. 185–186, from 
the Pāli]; Nārada, 1987, pp. 212, 223–225; Olivelle, 1996, p. 216 [Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad 
3.2]; Rhys Davids, 1900/1974, p. lxxxvi). 
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d. That mindfulness (sati) is just one factor in a path of mental development which is 
eightfold, and that while it is one defining characteristic of skilful or “healthy” 
consciousness, it is, when correctly aroused, always accompanied by other factors 
that promote well-being (Dhs 1–57; Harvey, 2013, pp. 81–87; Saddhatissa, 1971, pp. 
45–57; Shaw, 2014, pp. 27–36, 139–156). 
e. Perhaps most crucially to this adaptation is the assumption within all forms of 
Buddhism, that there is an essential radiance proper to the mind itself (Gethin, 1998, 
pp. 202–218; Harvey, 2013, p. 247; Shaw, 2006a, pp. 31–32): “This mind, monks, is 
radiant, but is freed from impurities which come as visitors from outside” (AN I 10; 
trans. Shaw, 2014, p. 139, from the Pāli).  
 
While the three “unskilful” roots (akusala mūla) of greed (lobha), hatred (dosa), and delusion 
(moha) are endemic to human existence, according to the Abhidhamma material, there are, 
in all humans, two other roots, which produced rebirth in a human body. These are present 
in the underlying continuum of mind that is involved in deep sleep, and at the end of any 
thought process, according to the Abhidhamma method. They are also linked to the notion of 
an inherent radiance in the human mind, characterised by non-greed (alobha) or generosity 
(cāga or dāna) and non-hatred (adosa) or loving kindness (mettā). A third “skilful” root 
(kusala mūla), wisdom (paññā), is also present in most humans (As 76–81, 127–130, 149–
150, 159–162 [trans. Rhys Davids, 1920/1958, Vol. I, pp. 101–106, 167–171, 198–199, 212–
215, from the Pāli]). From the doctrinal point of view there are certainly powerful, “unskilful” 
factors that govern our “unconscious” and conscious behaviour. The notion of an 
“unconscious” mind is not apparent in early Buddhism (cf. Virtbauer, 2014), except possibly 
inasmuch as it could refer to the bhavaṅga (“life-continuum”) consciousness, “skilful” in most 
humans. The mind returns to the bhavaṅga at rest, in states of deep sleep, or at the 
culmination of the sense door and mind-door process by which the mind relates and 
responds to objects that arise from within the mind or from the sensory perception of the 
outside world. 
The notion of the radiant mind (pabhassara citta), articulated in various ways in different 
forms of Buddhism, is too complex to consider fully here, but should be explained a little 
more for these purposes. Within the framework of Southern Buddhism, the notion of 
luminosity, or radiance, is thought by some of the commentaries to apply to the bhavaṅga, a 
rather late Abhidhamma concept, referring to our state of mind when in deep, untroubled 
sleep. Other commentaries say it refers to the radiant mind that emerges in actively skilful 
(javana) states in the daily thought process, and in meditation. For our purposes here we 
take it as including all of these, but much more, in what we feel seems the most likely Sutta 
interpretation. Bodhi (2012) notes that what he terms “the natural luminosity of the mind” 
is, as he argues, “intrinsic to the mind itself, not to a particular kind of mental event”: it is just 
what consciousness itself is like (pp. 1597–1598, n. 46). The sutta on this radiance of mind 
(AN I 10) is far earlier than any Abhidhamma formulations, and while the reference to loving-
kindness in daily life or meditation a few lines later suggests some active meaning, including 
the development of the meditations, it seems far more likely that the passage, while 
including these particular contexts, offers simply a basic description of “mind” or 
Understanding mindfulness: Current epistemological, methodological, and ethical issues  27   
 
© SFU Forschungsbulletin SFU Research Bulletin 2017 (2) 
“consciousness”, when it is without encumbrance or defilement at all. The notion of an 
underlying luminosity is developed in other forms of Buddhism to encompass the idea of the 
tathāgatagarbha, the “embryonic” Buddha nature in all beings, and certain aspects of the 
dhammadhātu in the Yogacāra system; such discussion, though rewarding in itself, however, 
is beyond the scope of the argument here (Buswell, 1981; Harvey, 2013, pp. 27–9, 68, 92, 
138–45, 330). 
So, despite “unskilful” factors, there are “skilful” and healthy ones too. A child is as likely to 
suffer from, say, a repressed desire to be generous, or a feeling of love or joy that may be 
thwarted, as he/she is to suffer from a repressed desire or aversion. Indeed this supposition 
is starting to be vindicated in Western psychological study: recent research suggests that, 
contrary to much popular opinion, concern for the well-being of others is key to moral 
decision-making (Crockett et al., 2014). 
There are, however, some points that BP shares with modern Western psychology: 
1. That, as with modern psychology or therapy, the role of discussion, a guide and guidance is 
considered essential; teachers need to have themselves undergone training. The nature of 
this, however, perhaps needs some investigation (AN III 182–184; Nidd I 359–60; Shaw, 2014, 
pp. 12–21; Ud 34–37). 
2. That the teaching is, however, to be realized “each for him or herself”, not through an 
external agency, physical or human (Harvey, 2013, p. 245; Shaw, 2006b, pp. 119–121).   
3. That techniques associated with mindfulness are conducive to “health” of mind, whether this 
is framed within Buddhist terms or not. 
4. In a potential alignment with modern Western psychology, that advice and guidance should 
be appropriate to the needs of the individual, so that their requirements rather than doctrine 
or a preconceived pattern of recovery are paramount (AN I 206–211; AN III 316; AN IV 30; 
Shaw, 2006a, pp. 53–56, 129–134, 194–198; Ud 34–37). 
A number of factors may make much of this accompanying psychology in Buddhism in need of re-
interpretation and re-articulation within a secular Western therapeutic context. It would not be 
appropriate, for instance, for the UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE, 2016) 
to promote the teachings and practices of a non-secular tradition. Many people are attracted to 
various therapies associated with mindfulness precisely because it is taught apart from what are 
often termed the “trappings” of Buddhism; these would need to be presented fairly, and with a 
sense that it is a system of psychological analysis that suggests how other supports may arise from 
the practice of “mindfulness” as it is practiced in modern secular settings. The mindfulness 
movement itself has an ambivalent relationship with its Buddhist roots, and wishes to work within 
mainstream Western psychological theory and clinical practice. The textual, practice-based, and 
traditional background, however, provides insights into how mindfulness is seen and interpreted in 
its own setting, and suggests some ways in which it could usefully be seen within the framework of 
modern Western psychological systems. 
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1.2 Western Reception  
Western clinical mindfulness has been based on BP from its beginning. However, the grounds on 
which the reception of Buddhism in Western medicine and psychology has taken place can 
themselves be questioned (cf. Lopez, 2012; Virtbauer, 2012). According to Kabat-Zinn (2013), 
mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) is “deeply rooted in dharma” (p. 602). The four formal 
MBSR methods Kabat-Zinn introduces in Full catastrophe living, namely sitting meditation, body 
scan, yoga, and walking meditation, are methods rooted in IP. However, until recently the indigenous 
Buddhist psychological perspective has hardly played any role at all in the development and 
discussions of clinical mindfulness. To discuss this matter means not only to question how Buddhist 
and clinical mindfulness can or cannot be integrated but also to reflect on what the meeting of 
Buddhist and Western psychology implies epistemologically and methodologically. What does 
authoritative knowledge mean from the perspective of BP and Western psychology? What are 
appropriate methods to generate valid knowledge? 
Doing IP means to research and understand psychological phenomena from an indigenous, emic (in 
this case Indian psychological), perspective (Bhawuk, 2010; Bhawuk & Srinivas, 2010; Rao et al., 
2008; Sinha, 1958/2008, 1961/2008, 1969/2008). In mindfulness meditation the meditator applies 
the most important Buddhist psychological research method of investigating the functioning of the 
human mind-and-body (nāma-rūpa), namely sati, which is now commonly though not necessarily 
most fortunately, rendered as “mindfulness” (Bodhi, 2011; Gethin, 2011; Gombrich, 2009). Usually 
indigenous psychologies based on first-person research, as in the case of IP, challenge the 
mainstream Western scientific approaches to human experience and behaviour, for these are firmly 
based on third-person research that is based on the Western scientific methodology that validates 
psychological knowledge (Rao, 2008; Wallace, 2007). 
The link between first and third person in research requires greater investigation (e.g., Pickering, 
2006; Roth, 2006). To a limited degree the tension between first- and third-person approaches to 
mindfulness has been reflected in the field of Western clinical mindfulness. For example, the 
developers of the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory refer to the problem of researching the 
phenomenon of mindfulness with the mainstream quantitative means of psychology. They ask for 
cautiousness and suggest that it is not feasible “simply to instrumentalise and integrate mindfulness 
into a scientific operational world view” (Walach et al., 2009, p. 758, trans. from the German). The 
Mind & Life Institute (2016) emphasises the need for first-person research in mindfulness. However, 
though there have been a limited number of qualitative, phenomenological, and dialogical designs 
(e.g., Full, Walach, & Trautwein, 2013; Kudesia & Nyima, 2015; Shonin & Van Gordon, 2015) there are 
few examples of real methodological innovations arising from the meeting of BP and clinical 
psychology. 
Generally, Western psychology conducts research in its usual way, with mindfulness as its new 
object. Clinical evidence in mindfulness is mainly based on psychometrics and neuroscience. 
Evidence refers to quantitative and material correlates of mindfulness. Correlates are objectified and 
made independent of the experiencer. Buddhist mindfulness (sati) has not been able to shake up 
mainstream Western scientific epistemology. It has not been able to change how psychological 
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objectivity is methodologically approached. However, from the perspective of BP, sati is meant to do 
exactly this. Engaging in this question requires the reflection of all things through mindfulness 
including one’s conditioned ways of researching it. 
The term “evidence”, in Buddhist mindfulness practice, does not mean establishing that mindfulness 
really works by means of objectifying (scientific) methods. Rather, it is to learn intuitively to “see” 
how things really are including the scientific methods that are employed to research human nature 
and mindfulness. This “seeing” needs to be experientially tested and refined against one’s qualities of 
perception and cognition to develop increasingly clear understanding of the characteristics of 
phenomena. Only a highly trained mind – from the perspective of BP mainly (but not only) by the 
means of sati – can learn to “see” in this way. 
1.3 Mindfulness in BP 
If we look at the textual, historical, and practice-based accounts of mindfulness within the Buddhist 
tradition, and consider this contextual background, in terms of practice and theory, we find out that 
mindfulness is considered just one, though crucially important, element in a path of practice which is 
eightfold, and which also includes right view (sammā-diṭṭhi), right intention (sammā-saṅkappa), right 
speech (sammā-vācā), right action (sammā-kammanta), right livelihood (sammā-ājīva), right effort 
(sammā-vāyāma), (right mindfulness [sammā-sati],) and right concentration (sammā-samādhi). It 
should be mentioned at this point that the Suttas do also record a “wrong mindfulness” (micchāsati), 
just as the other factors of the eightfold path may on occasion be “wrong” or “false” (DN III 214; DN 
III 274); this application is found occasionally, though rarely, in more Abhidhamma based analysis 
(Dhs 1349). The fairly frequent Sutta references warn against “wrong” factors of the eightfold path, 
with some intimation that they actively militate against their opposites. Presumably when it is 
“wrong” or “false”, mindfulness arises in a distorted form, as the alertness present when there is 
desire to harm or steal from another, or as a kind of ingrained negligence “to be thrown away as 
dregs” (Paṭis II 86). The Buddha, for instance, on one occasion notes that a deeply corrupt and vicious 
monk defiles the assembly and has “wrong mindfulness” (micchāsati; AN IV 205). There is also the 
much milder and not so reprehensible muṭṭhasati[no], “forgetful in mindfulness” (Vbh 351), which 
appears to refer to a lack of decorum or care. While the commentaries do not appear to explain the 
term, it is used in one example to describe slightly unruly and lax monks, for instance (S I 61)! The 
word asati, “unmindful”, like this term, seems also mild, largely applicable to normal, occasional 
lapses of attention and carelessness rather than the directed commitment to a “wrong” or “false” 
path of micchāsati (Ja III 486, VI 77). When skilful, however, its far more usual Sutta and 
Abhidhamma usage, sati is accompanied, whenever it arises, with other mental states that support it 
and shape its presence in the healthy or “skilful” mind. These place it as influencing, and influenced 
by, other factors of the eightfold path. 
Indeed such mindfulness is seen as one of the distinguishing features of the skilful mind. Textual 
references identify a number of features of the mental state (cetasika) of mindfulness, making it a 
central element of skilful consciousness. In Milindapañha (Mil), a second century BCE work regarded 
as canonical by the Burmese, the quality is said to have two characteristics: “Not drifting away 
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(apilāpana) is a distinguishing mark of mindfulness [see Dhs 14; Shaw, 2014, pp. 221–224; 
mindfulness is not allowing things to float away when at sea, or, be forgotten – ‘not wobbling’, as 
Horner, 1963, p. 50, puts it; see also Rhys Davids 1890/1925, p. 58, n. 2], and taking up (upagaṇhanā) 
is a distinguishing mark of mindfulness” (Mil 37–39; for upagaṇhanā, see DP I 441: “seizing, drawing 
to oneself, becoming master of”, or CPD II 436: “taking up”; see also Horner, 1963, p. 50, n. 6, and 
MA I 82–3; Rhys Davids, 1890/1925, p. 58, n. 2, gives “keeping up”). Mindfulness, 
… when it arises (the verb apilāpati “to remind, enumerate”, here in the causative, is of a 
different root from “not drifting away” [apilāpana; see above], so a pun is intended), keeps 
the measure of skilful and unskilful states, blameworthy and irreproachable states, inferior 
and superior states, dark, bright and evenly mixed states, … and in this way the practitioner 
then practises the things that should be practised, and does not practise the things that 
should not be practised. He follows things that should be followed and does not follow things 
that should not be followed. In this way, great king, not drifting away is a distinguishing mark 
of mindfulness. (Mil 37; trans. Shaw, 2014, p. 220, from the Pāli) 
A simile is made in this work with the treasurer of a great king, that can inform the monarch, the 
mind, of all his resources, at any time. A second function is that when mindfulness arises, it 
… examines the course of mental states that are of benefit and not of benefit, thinking: 
‘These mental states are of benefit, these are not of benefit, these mental states are helpful 
[upakāra], these mental states are not helpful.’ And then the practitioner removes mental 
states that are not of benefit and takes up mental states that are of benefit, and removes 
mental states that are not helpful and takes up mental states that are helpful. (Mil 37–38; 
trans. Shaw, 2014, p. 221, from the Pāli) 
Mindfulness exercises a kind of intuitive discrimination, guiding the mind towards what is good for it, 
and taking it away from what is not (cf. Soma, 1981/2003, pp. xv–xxvii). The doctrine of an innate 
health or radiance to the mind reinforces this sense of mindfulness as having an instinctively ethical, 
and even common-sense apprehension of wholesomeness and the means of sustaining psychological 
health. A third element to its function, as Harvey (2015) and Kuan (2008) point out, is that it turns the 
mind to “certain salutary things”, such as the ten recollections, meditations within Buddhism, that 
are usually taught alongside other techniques, to support, encourage, and ensure a sustained and 
even development of the mind to health. They involve a sustained and conscious application of 
mindfulness: to the qualities of the Buddha and the awakened mind, the teaching that is to be 
realized “each for himself”, the community of monks and those that have attained path, one’s own 
generosity, one’s own morality, beings of higher realms, the body, death, the breath, and the peace 
of attaining an end to suffering. Some of these anussatis – a word which means “repeated 
mindfulness” or “bringing to mind again and again” (anu, “repeatedly” + sati) – are constantly 
encouraged by the Buddha when dealing with people who have many lay commitments, with houses 
full of children, or who are involved in busy work (AN V 332–334, 336; Shaw, 2006a, pp. 123–134). 
They are central to understanding the Buddhist approach to health of mind, within a lay and active 
working life. The first three are always taught to those practicing meditation; many of the others are 
too. The anussatis are also consciously practised in Southern Buddhist contexts at, say, the approach 
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to death. At that time the dying person is reminded of earlier acts of generosity or kindness as a 
meditation to help bring peace for death, a time considered to be of great importance as the one at 
which the nature of the future rebirth is decided: it is a simple “mindfulness” exercise, which could 
be valuable during terminal care in secular contexts. In the Mettā-sutta (Sn 25–26), perhaps the most 
famous Southern Buddhist text of all, the practice of loving kindness (mettā) towards all beings is 
also described as a “mindfulness”. In modern practice, meditation teachers in Southeast Asia and 
elsewhere also stress this guiding, intuitive aspect to mindfulness. 
Mindfulness in these terms is perceived somewhat differently within the Buddhist tradition from the 
way it is described in modern mindfulness movements. An innate sense of the ethical, a balancing 
property of the mind that allows its health to be maintained, a sense of flexibility and a willingness to 
work under new conditions, a discriminatory quality that avoids action that could be harmful to self 
or others, and a sense that the practice of loving kindness is a domain of mindfulness, all support the 
commentarial point that mindfulness is just one aspect of the awake and “skilful” mind, and that this 
mind is capable of finding peace and, in Buddhist terms, awakening (bodhi). It is a means of steering 
the mind to an active (kamma) state that reflects the radiance of the mind said to be present in the 
underlying substratum of consciousness (bhavaṅga), to which the mind returns when at rest (Gethin, 
1998, pp. 215–217; Shaw, 2014, pp. 141–146). Others that also feature in the skilful mind of the 
Abhidhamma system are the qualities of “self-respect” (hiri) and “regard for consequences” 
(ottappa: these two are regarded as the “guardians of the world” that prevent people from acting in 
ways that could harm themselves or others), confidence (saddhā), and the attributes of tranquillity, 
softness, lightness, workability, health and straightness of mind and body (citta/kāya). These 
supporting factors prevent views from becoming rigid, stray thoughts from becoming obsessive, and 
the natural ups and downs of the mind from becoming depression or excitement. Equipoise also 
maintains this balance (tatramajjhattatā: literally, “being right there in the middle”, synonymous to 
upekkhā, “equanimity”, as a mental quality of balance). Mindfulness, working with these factors, is 
known as the doorkeeper to the mind, guarding what goes in and what goes out (AN IV 106–113); it 
is also the “salt” to the food of the other aspects of the mind, enhancing the flavour of the others, 
and, indeed, when it arises, these other qualities do too (As 121–122). Within the Abhidhamma 
system, mindfulness is a distinguishing feature of the healthy and skilful mind. Most people, most of 
the time, do not feel that their behaviour is mindful or “healthy”. But even if the notion of an 
underlying radiance may be alien to some, moments during the day when it does arise are 
considered greatly restorative and health-giving and worthy of remembrance. 
Mindfulness is essentially an embodied practice (Virtbauer, 2016b). Ven. Saddhatissa, a prominent 
meditation practitioner and scholar of the 20th century writes: 
Care must be taken to be neither too objective nor too subjective; we are not being asked to 
look at our bodies as “things” moving puppet-like before the watching mind; nor are we 
asked to “feel” very acutely every movement and gesture. What is required is that we try to 
live here and now “in our bodies”. This might seem a bizarre request, but once we try and 
experience this state we realize how rarely in fact we are “living in our bodies”, how rarely 
we are aware of the movements of our limbs and the interplay of our muscles. Mindfulness 
of the body can be practised too by watching the breath flowing in and out of the nostrils, by 
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listening to sounds impinging on the ear, not pausing to name or judge them, but just noting 
their arising and passing away. We can learn to become aware of the taste and texture of 
food, not after the manner of a gourmet or a connoisseur, … but simply in order to intensify 
awareness, noting the order and intensity of sensations, the varieties of flavour, 
temperatures, colours etc. (Saddhatissa, 1971, pp. 54–55) 
Operating with other factors, mindfulness is considered within the Buddhist tradition as providing an 
appreciation and contentment in basic daily activities, which ensure the mind is strong and not easily 
unbalanced. As Dhammasāmi writes: 
Not excitement but an ordinariness is a challenge to the human mind. It is difficult to grasp 
and penetrate. There are enormous beauties in such ordinary activity we repeat every day of 
our life. Take for example, walking, eating, washing, speaking, sleeping and so on. If we 
discover their beauties and enjoy them, we will then start living every moment of our life, no 
more feeling bored.  
There is no pressure in enjoying the beauties of ordinariness. You only need constant 
awareness, which is two fold; first the kind of awareness we try to develop through intensive 
practice of meditation, and general awareness, that we should have in daily life. Walking 
simply gives you a lot of joy. Going to work, driving back home, meeting the same people in 
your life, doing the same job, eating almost the same things, taking your children to school, 
earning and spending – they do not make you bored any more. You just enjoy every moment 
of doing your routine. This is the secret of happiness. (Dhammasāmi, 2000, pp. 54–55) 
This context provides us important background. Both Abhidhamma and Sutta, from which this 
material derives, are hugely popular in Southeast Asia, in Burma and Thailand in particular, and 
would be regarded by most Southern Buddhist practitioners as providing their underlying 
psychological system and theoretical base for self development; they offer a doctrinal underpinning 
to a still living tradition of practice and mental development. Mindfulness is one, but just one, factor 
in this. 
At this point, we make some reference to Western counterparts, where the presence of practices 
that could in some degree be related to “mindfulness” practice is ancient. The subject of “religious” 
uses of analogous practices has remained largely unexplored, but offers useful perspectives for those 
who are practicing in other traditions. It would be disingenuous for any good clinical practitioner to 
claim that no underlying model of the mind and its workings is operating when techniques are 
suggested as part of a systematic therapeutic exercise. Because of this it may also be helpful and 
even crucial for the long-term success of any therapy to have some knowledge of the native tradition 
of the patient/client. The remembering the presence of God in all activities is described from early 
times and enjoined by St Augustine (The Nature of Memory, Book X; Pusey, 1909–1914). Early texts 
and Christians may not have used any term that has been recently translated as “mindfulness”, but 
their encouragement of this ever-present awareness suggests that is exactly what they are 
describing, and more. At that time, and in Christian contexts, this would inevitably have included a 
kind of mindfulness of God: of one’s part of a larger universe and one’s participation in something 
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greater than oneself. By restricting the term to its precise linguistic history, one can miss the 
application of qualities in these early traditions that are not so far in some ways from modern 
mindfulness methods. St Augustine’s observations on memory and the recollection (Latin 
recognescere; cogenda; colligenda) show how words very kin are used from the outset of the 
tradition, involving the bringing to mind this remembered presence (O’Donnell, 1992; Pusey, 1909–
1914). We should say more than this: that a sense of the constant presence of God involved, or 
indeed involves, a “mindfulness” of fields and domains that are simply not included in modern 
secular mindfulness discourse. For some clients/practitioners in modern settings such a path may, 
however, be very important in their recovery of health. The Jesus prayer, that links mantra and 
breath recollection, offers another good example of such a “mindfulness”. It should be stressed, 
however, as in so many of such traditions, careful guidance with a longstanding practitioner is 
strongly emphasised for this recollection (Palmer & Kallistos Ware, 2014; Kallistos Ware, 2016). In 
this regard, Christianity offers a distinguished counterpart to the Buddhist teachings, for practices 
which are enjoined in BP for four domains or fields: that of body (Pāli kāya), feeling (vedanā), mind 
(citta) and an untranslatable term, dhammas, or things as they are (MN I 55–63 [Satipaṭṭhāna-
sutta]). Practically speaking, although the Western materialist scientific world view may make 
reference to another system difficult, good therapists/practitioners may see, occasionally, that 
referral may be necessary and a useful concomitant of therapy. We need to bear in mind that the 
Western scientific viewpoint itself sometimes rests on world views that can render it an “implicit 
religion”. It takes for granted assumptions, such as the privileging of the materialist world view, or a 
notion of non-continuity after death, which would be termed “annihilationist” in Buddhism, and thus 
not representative of the middle way. Such modern Western “beliefs” may not be shared by many 
clients/patients in other traditions (Bailey, 1999). So a necessarily secular point of view may then 
nonetheless accommodate a suggestion that a client/patient also find contact with his/her own 
practice tradition, or articulate his/her return to health in those terms. The Buddha geared his 
teachings carefully to the imagery, language, and predisposition of those he taught and had 
interactions (AN IV 84–88; SN III 106–109; Ud 34–37). As was noted earlier, many cultures and 
psychological systems have historically taken the heart, rather than the head, as their underlying 
basis. A system that is open to such an experiential supposition, and which is flexible and open with 
regard to the underlying religious orientation of the practitioner, could offer a more suitable and 
adaptive vocabulary of transformation for some clients/patients than the model provided by what is 
essentially, in the terms of these traditions, a “new” discipline, that has its own beliefs and tenets, 
however useful and indeed complementary they may be in aiding the recovery of the client/patient. 
2 Epistemology, Methodology, and Ethics 
In BP, applied mindfulness is the method to validate mindfulness itself, as well as its effects. 
Referring to the four noble truths, if one can sense that all conditioned things ultimately are 
suffering, transient, and without an inherent enduring quality of self (i.e., one can reflect oneself, 
one’s self, and one’s self- and world-view and the factors that have produced it) one will become 
interested in intuitively understanding the origin, the cessation, and the way to the cessation of this 
suffering, or “stress”, as the word dukkha is sometimes translated today (Thanissaro, 1993). Through 
34  Gerald Virtbauer, 22 - 49 
© SFU Forschungsbulletin SFU Research Bulletin 2017 (2) 
intuitive insight the suffering caused by discursive knowledge can be understood but without this 
suffering intuitive insight cannot occur. Put differently, one first needs to learn and reflect 
conditioned things and the suffering caused by them. Then one may move on and find the source of 
suffering within oneself. The Buddha’s life story in the Pāli canon follows this pattern (Ñāṇamoli, 
1992; cf. Shaw, 2010). If this source is found it becomes clear why there is (and has to be) suffering in 
oneself and the world, but also how it may be alleviated. In Buddhism the ability to reflect in this way 
distinguishes humans from other sentient beings. It is the reason why humans may attain awakening 
and deliverance (from suffering and continuous existence). 
Within a materialist scientific world view, Buddhist mindfulness certainly cannot replace Western 
scientific methods. However, from the strictly experiential perspective of BP and other indigenous 
(including Western) phenomenological systems, Western scientific methods can neither capture nor 
explain the phenomenon of mindfulness itself. It is potentially a clash of fundamentally different 
epistemologies. However, Buddhism has always adapted to change, and reframed many of its basic 
tenets according to local beliefs, customs and doctrine (Cousins, 1997; Harvey, 2013, pp. 1–7; Shaw, 
2009, pp. 27–34). Western doctrines are those of the pre-eminence of the scientific world view and a 
start has been made on introducing techniques from elsewhere. This paper suggests that the process 
could be helped by some basic introduction to the theory of the mind too. Certain features of the 
understanding of mind that characterize the Abhidhamma schools and their method would need to 
be highlighted at the outset of any such introduction. The first is the assumption, that has already 
been mentioned, throughout all forms of Buddhism that there is an inherent radiance, or health to 
the mind itself, in itself a potentially helpful notion in the path to a recovery of health, for some, if 
not all. This means that some words, like “individuation” or “a sense of self”, with positive 
connotations, are appropriate and could indeed start to be used in such contexts. Key to our 
understanding is to see the implication of one crucial term in Buddhist theory: ekaggatā, which 
means, literally “gone to oneness”, or “unification”. Present in all consciousness, and so there in 
what are termed unskilful, unwholesome or unhealthy states as well as positive or wholesome 
states, it is deepened, with positive implications, in states of meditation or happiness. In such states 
ekaggatā is always accompanied by mindfulness, and, in jhāna (deeper states of meditation), by 
wisdom, if the states are healthy. “Wrong concentration” is mentioned, and is associated with wrong 
courses of the mind, when it becomes focused and obsessive, or practices a meditation that is 
unskilful and which closes the mind. It is characterized by the absence of mindfulness (Dhs 375). As 
so often with popularisations of ideas, which are changed as they become current amongst the 
general populace, the notion of an “absence of self” can be a very harmful teaching, whether in a 
Buddhist context or any other, if it is not understood correctly (Hamilton, 2000). Some populist 
understandings of Buddhism, that one somehow has “to get rid of the self” could, of course, damage 
the emergent sense of confidence and identity a therapy may be encouraging. But they do not 
represent Buddhist teaching on what could more properly be termed the “selflessness” and 
“unification” of the mind that is awake. It should be stressed, incidentally, that this paper is not 
dealing with the important area of Buddhist meditative development, itself requiring a separate 
study (see Harvey, 2015; Shaw, 2014). The sense of “selflessness” and “unification” are in part 
aroused by the simple presence of “skilful consciousness”, but also by the practice of calm or 
samatha meditation. States of ever increasing calm, in development of the meditations (jhānas), 
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allow for the fullest development of “unification”. These meditations are traditionally regarded in 
Southern Buddhism as essential also for the full development of insight (vipassanā), which will not be 
complete and balanced without the peace and contentment they provide. Indeed, the “salutary” 
mindfulnesses (anussatis) are considered ten of the forty calm meditation objects described by 
Buddhaghosa, and comprise a key part in the healthy development of meditative practice, including 
some activities in daily life. Such recollections come under the broad category of bhāvanā, a term for 
activities that include investigation, devotional practices, discussion, and sitting meditation too 
(Shaw, 2014, pp. 12–57). 
What may be a solution to the “problem” of mindfulness in Western psychological science (cf. Miller 
& Sivvy, 2014)? If mindfulness is “reduced” to fit into the current Western psychological 
epistemological mainstream it loses its context, traditional support systems, and the means whereby 
it is part of a path that leads, in graduated stages, “onwards” (opanāyiko). It works as a stress 
reduction method but it is not meant to be (only) this. The clinical mindfulness classic itself may be 
quoted to support this argument: 
Awareness itself is not highly valued [in modern education], nor are we taught the richness of 
it and how to nurture, use, and inhabit it—how it can round out the limitations and sometimes 
the tyranny of thinking, and provide a counterbalance to our thinking and our emotions, 
serving as the independent dimension of intelligence that it actually is. (Kabat-Zinn, 2013, p. 
593) 
Throughout the book Kabat-Zinn (2013) deals with important themes of BP, which are critical for the 
understanding of mindfulness (cf. Kabat-Zinn, 2013, pp. 602–603; 2005; 2011). However, in Full 
catastrophe living (Kabat-Zinn, 2013) he addresses these themes primarily from the perspective of 
Western scientific developments and findings that support or rather evidence them, based on the 
scientific epistemology underpinning the modern Western education in schools and universities that, 
as he points out, does not value awareness. 
What happens experientially in the mindful mind-and-body? How can the direct experience of 
mindfulness be described “as the independent dimension of intelligence that it actually is” (Kabat-
Zinn, 2013, p. 593)? Full catastrophe living (Kabat-Zinn, 2013) is interesting to be read together with 
works of BP (e.g., the two important commentarial meditation manuals of Theravāda Buddhism 
[Vism; Ehara, Soma, & Kheminda, 1961/1995]). BP provides the psychology that describes in depth 
how mindful processes experientially manifest in the mind-and-body. Describing mindfulness 
phenomenologically and developing a contemporary structural psychology of mindfulness is different 
to evidencing mindfulness by materialist scientific means. Western psychological approaches to and 
definitions of mindfulness (for a review see Baer, 2015) are often not based on a solid Buddhist 
psychological foundation of mindfulness in theory and practice. From the perspective of BP, such a 
foundation is essential for describing mindfulness in experientially precise details. Precise 
descriptions of experiential details of mindfulness can be found in the original Buddhist literature, 
such as the Sutta and Abhidhamma, as well as the later exegetical Pāli literature and accounts from 
some modern practitioners and teachers cited in this paper. The “intelligence” involved here is not 
cleverness or a high IQ. A famous Dhammapada commentarial story describes a monk attaining 
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awakening on a simple meditation object, after appearing a failure to others through his complete 
inability to remember the verses he is supposed to learn (DhpA I 239–255; Shaw, 2014, pp. 185–186). 
Many schools of Buddhism stress this intuitive rather than intellectual wisdom, that contributes to 
what the Thais call jai yen, a coolness of heart and tranquillity in the presence of change (Cassaniti, 
2015). The development of a contemporary BP would need to be based on this literature and body of 
experience (Virtbauer, 2016b). It would need, perhaps, to be a little more open in understanding 
exactly what mindfulness is. Also the Western science of mindfulness could start its investigations of 
mindfulness based on this literature and body of experience (Virtbauer, 2013, 2015). 
The health- and clinical-psychological aspects of mindfulness may be developed more efficiently if 
mindfulness is also understood and applied from the broader perspective of the indigenous 
psychology in which is has been developed and experientially tested over more than two millennia. 
BP provides a comprehensive and consistent theory on the phenomenon of mindfulness and its 
influence on the mind-and-body. A similar theoretical clarity and comprehensiveness on experiential 
dimensions of mindfulness cannot be found in the Western mindfulness-based interventions. Hence, 
Buddhist mindfulness could play a key role in contemporary mindfulness. 
A science of mindfulness “deeply rooted in dharma” (Kabat-Zinn, 2013, p. 602) would be based on 
the study of mindfulness’s roots. This study is difficult, requires extensive training in Buddhist 
thought, and at least one Buddhist language; it cannot really be understood in its context by studying 
secondary literature alone. It also needs a considerable amount of straightforward practice 
experience. The Buddhist psychological theory of mindfulness ideally should be understood in its 
original scriptural context, though some if not most Buddhist schools teach this as part of a more 
experiential development. It is quite unrealistic that, for example, a neuroscientist that researches 
mindfulness also trains as a Buddhist scholar, or vice versa, given the intensity of training required for 
the disciplines that contribute to the Western science of mindfulness. Mindfulness requires 
interdisciplinary collaboration – one could even say it needs some gentle mindfulness of other 
approaches, in other fields. However, there may be a Buddhist basic training agreed by researchers in 
this field in the future: the study of Abhidhamma, for instance, to this day a largely popular 
psychological system, would help to give some background to the supporting factors traditionally 
considered to arouse, sustain, and protect the mind in mindfulness training. Contact and interchange 
with longstanding lay and monastic practitioners in Southeast Asia and the West could also help this 
from becoming too “cerebral”. Intellectuals do not have any greater likelihood of finding 
mindfulness, and the teaching is intended to be intuitively, not just rationally grasped. BP could play 
a more important role in mindfulness training than it currently does. BP facilitates the understanding 
of the roots of the science of mindfulness. Most importantly, BP provides an idiom that can capture 
(or at least comprehensively point out) the experiential understanding of the phenomenon of 
mindfulness itself. Such an idiom is currently missing in Western scientific mindfulness. 
Western scientific epistemology and methodology can be critically reflected and enriched through 
Buddhist ethical and psychological considerations, thus developing experiential understanding 
through both the first and the third person (e.g., Pickering, 2006; Roth, 2006; Virtbauer, 2016b). Two 
such Buddhist considerations may help to clarify how such reflection and enrichment may take place. 
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2.1 Intentionality 
The intentional quality (Pāli cetanā, chanda) in a state of consciousness determines “one’s” kamma 
(Sanskrit karma). In the words of the Buddha: “I say that intention is [the source of] kamma; for 
having intended one [consequently] acts through [one’s] body, speech, or mind (Pāli cetanā ’haṃ … 
kammaṃ vadami; cetayitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā)” (AN IV 415). This is one of the 
most important ideas of Buddhist psychological ethics. 
It is difficult to translate kamma satisfactorily. In Buddhism it does not mean the observable or 
objective result of “action”. Rather, it is a psychological quality that determines the state of being of 
the doer. Buddhism postulates that it is the psychological quality underpinning the deed that 
determines the future of the doer. One will “feel” or “be” in the future what one psychologically 
cultivates in the present – either wholesome or unwholesome. This refers to the bearer of the 
kamma him-/herself. 
However, one’s kamma always manifests in a relational network. Hence, it has direct and indirect 
influences on the outside world. This may be very clear in simple everyday experience: For example, 
if one does something “good” for someone but with aversion, the doer probably will not feel “good” 
in the process of the action and afterwards: that is, he/she bears the fruits of his/her kamma in 
his/her (future) states of consciousness. In this case the connection between cause and effect may 
seem obvious for the bearer of kamma, in others it is much more subtle. In this case, also the 
“receiver” of the deed may feel the negative impact of aversion despite the “good” result. On the 
other hand, if someone with “good” intentions affects someone negatively in the process of an 
action, he/she may be able to cope with it well (or at least better than if the process is underpinned 
by “bad” intentions). 
The key point here is to understand that intentional qualities of consciousness create one’s sense of 
self and condition one’s senses of future selves. One will be in the future what one cultivates in one’s 
“inner” world now. One’s sense of self manifests in a relational network. It is not divided from the 
“outside” world. To understand what happens in the world refers to one’s ability to critically reflect 
one’s own intentions and the quality of consciousness underpinning one’s actions. From this 
perspective, it becomes clear why the cultivation of an ethical way of perceiving and apperceiving 
that qualifies self-centredness and puts one’s sense of self in a relational context is of utmost 
importance in the Buddhist system. This cultivation refers to both discursive ethical reflection and 
intuitive meditative insight. 
This is a pragmatic psychological description of kamma. Ultimately, “the doer”, “the deed”, and “the 
doer’s kamma” are all based on cause and effect. Kamma cannot be psychologically analysed from 
the perspective of a single life. Kamma is the force that creates and recreates the world. Hence, it is 
intention that creates and recreates the world humans construct and inhabit. Nevertheless, within 
this causal Buddhist theory there is a potential for freedom and active change of “one’s” kamma to 
the better. Mindfulness is one method in discovering and cultivating this potential. 
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2.2 Process-Centred Ethics 
Western secular scientific ethics, such as ethics in psychology, mainly focus on the past and future. 
Based on past procedures and results future benefits of a certain procedure or study are inferred. 
These benefits are weighed against ethical considerations and legal requirements. Research designs 
and goals are justified based on discursive and analytical inference. How scientists experience the 
research process itself often will not be of relevance if the process ethically has been justified and 
approved. Unfortunately, this also counts for the science of experience and behaviour (i.e., 
psychology) itself. 
One may say that BP does not know this kind of ethics. There are moral obligations in the Buddha’s 
dhamma (“teachings”), which Buddhists are to follow (or to train in – sikkhāpadāni, “steps in the 
[Buddhist] training”). However, Buddhism emphasises that the usefulness and, indeed, necessity of 
these guidelines are to be realised in one’s experience, from one conscious moment to the next. 
Buddhist ethics (sīla), as part of the noble eightfold path and the four noble truths, refers to 
behaviour that is concerned with and addresses one’s own and others’ suffering (or, positively put, 
one’s own and others’ well-being), the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the way to 
the cessation of suffering in the present process of one’s experience. 
What does this practically mean? The Buddhist psychologist is concerned with the situation at hand – 
one may say in a spontaneous response to how he/she experiences him-/herself and his/her world in 
the present moment. The present situation counts for one’s mental development. The present 
situation is the only situation with which ethically can be dealt. This process-centred ethics approach 
does not deny the practical necessity to plan for the future. However, ethics has to manifest and is 
shaped directly in the process of one’s present experience. The mental qualities underpinning and 
shaping behaviour in this process are reflected – from moment to moment. 
For an experienced meditator this reflection refers to intuitive awareness of one’s mental states and 
to calm and insight based on mindfulness. Behaviour should lead to less suffering, or positively put, 
to greater happiness. Genuine well-being and happiness depends on wholesome states of 
consciousness. Mindfulness is a tool to realise how states of consciousness (either wholesome or 
unwholesome) and behaviour interact. If one’s behaviour is motivated by conscious qualities such as 
compassion or generosity suffering will decrease and one’s present quality of life will increase. If 
qualities such as aversion or greed are dominant the opposite will happen. The simplicity of this 
understanding is of course complex in its application. According to the psychology of the 
Abhidhamma (cf. Abhidh-s; Dhs), as we have explored above, mindfulness (sati) can only be present 
in wholesome states of consciousness, which are characterised by wholesome qualities such as loving 
kindness or compassion (non-hatred), or generosity (non-greed). 
Process-centered ethics is the reason why it is impossible to have a state of consciousness that is 
based on and “includes” the mental quality of Buddhist mindfulness (sati) and, referring to the 
sniper, an example given in the contemporary mindfulness discourses (cf. Monteiro et al., 2015), at 
the same time intentionally to hurt or kill another being (cf. Olendzki, 2010). Another example more 
directly relating to scientific methodology is the scientist that is engaged in animal research and kills 
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an animal in a study. According to BP, one cannot be mindful while performing such actions. What 
the sniper and the scientist may have in common is a strong and focussed attention (in Pāli 
manasikāra refers to “attention”, an ethically indeterminate quality that is present in all states of 
consciousness). However, sati proper (i.e., skilful mindfulness), can only be present in states of 
consciousness that are skilful or wholesome, which cannot include mental qualities that may lead to 
intentional killing of a living being. What this means for the psychological application of mindfulness 
in systems such as the military, is a difficult question (cf. Mikulas, 2015). From the Buddhist 
perspective, activities that are termed “mindful” may not include the actual mental quality of 
mindfulness. There cannot be mindful animal research (paradoxically, also in mindfulness research 
animal research occurs) that includes intentionally harming and killing animals. The starting point to 
discuss such points within the Western science of mindfulness would have to acknowledge the 
difficulties in understanding the nature of sati in its many applications. 
It is also interesting to reflect on contemporary psychological research methodology in mindfulness 
from the perspective of Buddhist process-centred ethics. The probably most important large-scale 
mindfulness study starts in 2016 assessing the effectiveness of mindfulness programmes in schools in 
the UK over 7 years. The biggest part of the project compares mindfulness training (MT) with 
“teaching as usual” in 76 schools involving around 6,000 students aged 11 to 14. This first large 
randomised control trial (RCT) on MT employs the classical intervention–control group design. 
Students in 38 schools receive MT over 10 lessons in a standard school term, whereas students in 38 
schools act as controls receiving standard personal, health, and social education lessons. The RCT 
runs over 5 years including follow-up periods of 2 years for each student. The outcomes researchers 
investigate include risk of depression, social and behavioural skills, and well-being, as well as 
secondary outcomes. The outcomes may have a significant influence on further policies in schools 
and other public sectors (Ryan, 2015; cf. Mindfulness All-Party Parliamentary Group, 2015). 
The Buddhist psychologist may not mainly (or maybe not at all) be focussing on third-person 
evidence (i.e., the evidence one currently needs to change policies). He/she may, for example, ask 
how the researchers in this trial (themselves experienced meditators) experience the process of 
doing research in which some thousand students receive MT, whereas others are not introduced into 
the practice for 2 years but act as controls to enable research that investigates if their MT peers 
significantly score better in areas such as depression. Does it feel “mindful” to do this? Why is 
mindfulness not immediately introduced to all? Such a question may seem naïve from a scientific 
perspective. Pragmatically, it is not a question that may be considered helpful towards the goal of 
changing policies. However, for the Buddhist psychologist there may be no reason why for 2 years 
thousands of students aged 11 to 14 – a critical and often difficult time in their lives – should act as 
controls and be deprived of the benefits of a practice whose benefits are evident to him/her – in this 
case, qualitative evidence based on his/her own first-person experience and his/her experience of 
the benefits of mindfulness for others, including children and teenagers. The clinical psychologist 
may say that this design is the direct or only way to realise evidence. 
Scientists discussing mindfulness usually emphasise the evidence (or lack thereof) on mindfulness, 
based on scientific research. Mindfulness, both Buddhist and clinical, “involves moving from a focus 
on content to a focus on process … toward [from the perspective of BP, the word “ethically” may be 
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added for clarity] attending to the way all experience is processed” (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 
2013, p. 74). Hence, scientific research and the process of doing it may not be evidenced by 
mindfulness. 
2.3 Mindful Science 
Science is a part of and in the world, whereas Buddhism – not as an institution but as a personal 
practice – is rooted in the intuitive understanding of being in the world. Ultimately, this 
understanding is beyond words, as words (apperception based on language) are a conditioned part 
of the world. These two dimensions can never entirely go together. 
The world is conditioned. Hence, it is the source and the result of suffering. The solution the Buddha 
suggests is psychological (Gombrich, 2009). It is an inner solution that helps one intuitively to 
understand the world and finally entirely to leave the world, in case one can reach the final goal of 
the Buddhist path. In this case, one has stopped creating new (positive or negative) kamma that 
leads to continuous rebirth. However, this solution and the way to it determine, and are based on, 
how one approaches the world. 
According to the Buddhist tradition, one can only finally leave the world based on psychological 
qualities such as generosity, compassion, and insight. As long as there are self-centred intentions one 
will be firmly fixed in the world, and crave continuous existence. Put differently, as long as one wants 
to be in the world (even for ethically profound reasons), one will be a part of it. If one can stop 
wanting, one will be able to engage in a way of living that causes least suffering to oneself and other 
beings, which produces mindfulness, and happiness too (Dhammasāmi, 2000, pp. 54–55; Virtbauer, 
2016a). Paradoxically, one enjoys the world more, as the delighted poems of early Buddhist monks 
and nuns, commenting on the world around them, attest (Rahula, 1974, p. 28; Shaw, 2006a, pp. 21–
22). One will stop approaching oneself and the world from a self-centred perspective. In the event of 
the Buddha’s words proving vindicated, one may then enter the happiness and contentment of 
nibbāna, leaving the world and its suffering altogether at death. Traditionally, this is where 
mindfulness may lead one, or, if the vow has been taken to become a bodhisatt(v)a, a being 
“attached to awakening”, a commitment to help others in future lifetimes too (Shaw, 2006b, pp. 1–
6). Lopez (2012) suggests that the Buddha may be regarded “as a counter-evolutionary, actively 
seeking the extinction of the human race, and indeed of all species, through the eradication of the 
selfish gene” (p. 80). From the perspective of Buddhist psychological ethics, it appears more accurate 
to say that the Buddha has clearly realised the cost of all life (i.e., all life depends – directly and 
indirectly – on the exploitation and destruction of other life). This realisation is accompanied by 
genuine loving kindness (mettā) and compassion (karuṇā) for the world and for all life (cf. DN I 235–
253; Gombrich, 2009; Sn 25–26). Based on this compassion, selfishness and craving for the 
continuation of life and its cost (and in this way of suffering) comes to an end. But in Buddhist terms, 
if the Bodhisatt(v)a vow has been taken, it may lead to a further and willing continuation of life, as a 
means to help other sentient beings too. Whether this vow is taken or not, the texts indicate that life 
itself is always appreciated, at each stage of the Buddhist path: the practice of mindfulness, rightly 
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undertaken, is said to lead naturally to joy, the central factor of awakening, and then to equanimity 
(Rahula, 1974, pp. 28, 67–75). 
From the perspective of early Buddhism, based on the early textual Pāli sources, complete “inner” 
letting-go is accompanied by and needs to be based on “outer” letting-go. This means that one can 
only go the middle path to its end if one adopts the ethics the Buddha suggests. The world (and the 
selves inhabiting it) cannot be re-created without craving and self-centred intentions. This is one of 
the main Buddhist insights. The world needs to be constantly created and re-created. 
Today, systematic scientific research and development and the structures underpinning it may be 
regarded the most important creators of the world. Science is to find out and apply one thing and 
then the next – an “endless” cycle creating and constructing the world (and the selves inhabiting it) 
and mirroring the intentions of the selves involved in the cycle. As long as there is a human world this 
cycle continues. Its intentional quality determines the world science creates. Understanding one’s 
intentions and reducing self-centredness by fostering wholesome psychological qualities will result in 
kamma that is conducive to creating a world that mirrors such wholesome qualities and a less 
egoistic and self-centred approach to the limitations and potentials of human life. 
Though suffering cannot be overcome through science a Buddhist-ethics-based science could be a 
system of intelligently, realistically, and profoundly ethically reducing suffering. The main question 
underlying all endeavours of such a science, as well as the practical considerations of scientists, may 
be formulated: What needs to be researched and what is to be done that is most conducive to 
reducing the suffering and enhancing the well-being of all beings? 
A Buddhist-ethics-based mindful science is in stark contrast to the Cartesian dualism of mind (Latin 
res cogitans, “cognising thing”) and matter (res extensa, “extended thing”), which has shaped much 
of modern Western scientific epistemology and methodology and has conditioned how the modern 
Western self approaches and understands his/her lifeworld (cf. Descartes, 1642/1698, pp. 35–46; 
Husserl, 1934–1937/1954; Virtbauer, 2016a). The mindful science cannot be reconciled with 
scientific “materialist monism” (Wallace, 2007). The mindful scientist finds him-/herself “in a buzzing 
world, amid a democracy of fellow creatures” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 50; cf. Dombrowski, 2014; Shaw, 
2006b, pp. lix–lxi). Non-human sentient beings are not considered and treated as insentient 
sophisticated machines in the Cartesian sense. The mindful science focuses on reducing the suffering 
of all beings and on mental and physical interdependence. It stresses that genuine human mental 
health depends on such a relational approach to nature and reality. 
3  Conclusion  
In this paper we have not considered the issue of meditation within a practice tradition, which would 
involve further investigation beyond the scope of this study. We suggest that Buddhist ethics and an 
understanding of the subtle system of psychology and the balanced way it is enacted, however, in 
theory and in practice, could underpin the Western science of mindfulness. Contemporary Western 
mindfulness’s roots are in the ancient Eastern tradition of Buddhism. The concept of mindfulness and 
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possibilities of its Western reception can be most comprehensively and efficiently reflected if one’s 
investigations start at its Buddhist roots. Though a critical epistemology has not yet played a visible 
role in its discourses, a science of mindfulness may start to reflect on its own scientific history and 
foundations from a more mindful perspective. Contemporary Western clinical mindfulness has 
naïvely assumed that the concept and practice of traditional Buddhist mindfulness can be received 
without questioning the mindfulness of the receiver (i.e., Western science). 
BP could play a more important role in the current clinical mindfulness discourses, the training of 
scientists in this field, and the employed research designs and instruments in contemporary 
mindfulness. Generally, Buddhist psychological ethics may provide an intelligent framework for 
Western secular scientific ethics. From the perspective of BP presented in this paper, the current 
second-generation mindfulness-based interventions (SG-MBIs) are not yet the answer to the need of 
an in-depth dialogue focusing on the underpinning epistemologies of Buddhist and clinical 
mindfulness. SG-MBIs may be an important step in this direction (cf. Shonin, Van Gordon, & Griffiths, 
2015). 
The Western science of mindfulness has revolutionised psychotherapeutic and psychiatric care. This 
paper suggests the psychology from which it is derived could also do so, and could initiate broader 
critical epistemological reflection in Western science, so building new bridges between Eastern and 
Western thought. A shift of focus from supposedly objective and neutral scientific evidence 
independent of human intentions, to an ethical relational understanding of intentions and outcomes 
appears to be imperative to approach and alleviate the suffering of today’s scientifically constructed 
world (and the selves inhabiting it). 
In sum, a future discipline focusing on mindfulness could include: A more closely investigated 
dialogue between Buddhist studies and psychological science with a particular focus on epistemology 
and ethics; an understanding of mindfulness based on its roots (ideally involving Buddhist languages 
too); a practical training that is diverse, including many different perspectives (both Buddhist and 
clinical); and, methodologically, much more openness to exploring how one can really find out things 
“mindfully” outside the accepted verities of mainstream Western scientific psychological thinking. 
Some consideration of meditation, an area so rich it is not considered fully here, could be included. 
The Western study of mindfulness has taken first hesitant steps in this direction. From the 
perspective of BP, many more steps are to follow. 
4 Abbreviations  
References to [volume and] page[s] of the Pali Text Society ed. 
Abhidh-s Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha 
AN  Aṅguttara-nikāya 
As  Atthasālinī (Dhammasaṅgaṇī-aṭṭhakathā) 
CPD  A Critical Pāli Dictionary (also see http://pali.hum.ku.dk/cpd) 
DhpA  Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā 
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Dhs  Dhammasaṅgaṇī 
DP  A Dictionary of Pāli (M. Cone) 
DN  Dīgha-nikāya 
Ja  Jātakatthavaṇṇanā 
MA  Majjhima-nikāya-aṭṭhakathā (Papañcasūdanī) 
Mil  Milindapañha 
MN  Majjhima-nikāya 
Nidd  Niddesa (I Mahāniddesa) 
Paṭis  Paṭisambhidāmagga 
Sn  Sutta-nipāta 
Ud  Udāna 
Vbh  Vibhaṅga 
Vism  Visuddhimagga 
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